What was the significance of lend-lease materials for the war on the Eastern Front (1941-1945)?

C.   Evaluation of sources

1. “Lend Lease to Russia”, from Major Jordan’ Diaries, NY, Harcourt, Brace, 1952, Chapter Nine.

This is a 26-paged document describing the type, quantity and cost (in US dollars) of all US material sent to the Soviet Union during the Second World War. It was written during the Korean War and when the US introduced harsher policies against Communism.

The purpose of the document is mostly professional; it was major Jordan’s job and interest to find out exactly what products had been sent to Russia. Major Jordan also wanted to prove that some goods had been sent illegally under the terms of the lend lease act which prohibited “goods furnished for relief and rehabilitation purposes.”  

This report is the sole source on this part of lend lease since the U.S. government never released a detailed description on the subject. Therefore, this report is extremely valuable: Historians have used it as a reference to their analysis on lend lease.  

It is, however, quite limited. Even though much data has been based on Soviet records, (Russian agents in the US going through the equipment before shipment) it is a “one man project” which could be biased. Also, it is well known that not all materials sent safely arrived to Russia.

2. Zhukov, G.K., Vospominanija I Razmysjlenija (“Memories and thoughts”), vol 1, 1974

This is field marshal Zhukov’s memoirs. It is written in 1974, when the détente in the Cold War was developing.

The purpose is probably highly personal: He describes his own opinion and thinking and one can sense a highly patriotic and anti-fascist tone.

The value of Zhukov’s memoirs lies in that it shows a Soviet field-marshal’s thinking at the time of the war. It also gives much detail on the state of the whole Soviet high command, especially on Stalin.

Nevertheless, this is a limited source. Most importantly it should not be taken for granted that the numerical figures and beliefs of Zhukov are true. This is a “one man project” aswell.  It is also interesting that there is no mention, at all, of lend lease products imported to Russia.

4. Analysis

Some information in Section B is missing or is uncertain due to lacking information and assumed favouritism. Until recently the subject of lend-lease has been highly secretive or biased due to the Cold War, and there are still significant differences between US and Soviet sources. This limitation of the investigation must be taken into account before making an analysis. Most tables in the appendix have been constructed on a mixture of sources to minimise error.

To begin with one should understand that 1941-1942 and 1943-1945 were two quite different periods in the war on the Eastern Front (see Section B). 1941 was “l’anée terrible”for USSR and many anticipated its defeat. It is hence arguable that lend-lease aid was needed more than ever for USSR this year. Lend-lease had though, hardly even started in 1941 and by 1942 a stumpy total of 1.8 millions tons of materials had arrived. Many of the early lend-lease materials were also “unsatisfactory”; for example the light tanks. In 1943 the lend-lease had gained a much more serious role not only because of the increased quantity it made up for, but also for the improved quality of products. But the aid was probably not needed as much in 1943 onwards, both due to Soviet military successes and by increased American, British and Canadian military involvement in the war.

Lend-lease might have supported USSR in these general ways: The industry; the military; the food-issue; psychologically. These topics will here be separately analysed although they are quite related.

The industry. Generally speaking, the lend-lease accelerated the soviet industry’s transformation to a war footing. Before the war, many Soviet factories produced civil items such as tractors, trucks, locomotives, railway carts and raw materials. When the war came most of those factories were set to produce combat materials instead. This does not mean, though, that civil materials were not needed anymore. Quite the opposite actually, transportation for example, was needed more than ever for supplies etc. The lend-lease brought 429687 motor vehicles, 1981 locomotives,11155 railway carts and masses of raw materials. Without this essential reinforcement the Soviet industry would have had to concentrate more on civil production e.g. raw materials and transportation vehicles. Consequently, the war industry would not be able to develop as fast as it did. This is important because some historians claim that it was, in fact, the size of the Soviet war industry that decided the outcome of the Eastern Front conflict.  

The military. Concerning pure military products, lend-lease had a smaller significance to USSR. From information in Section B one can calculate that only 8% of all Soviet tanks were provided by lend-lease and that they were all inferior to the mass-produced T-34. 16% of the aircraft is a more significant amount, since the quality was mostly better here, but evidence shows that most planes, as well as the better tank models were only seen in the Red Army by 1943. One should also include the enormous Soviet production of artillery guns; it strengthens the impression that lend-lease war-items were insignificant.

The counter argument is that the Soviet military was more dependent on civil lend-lease materials. The most important civil contribution were the motor vehicles: With these, the Red Army could perform operations requiring speed and mobility. 15 million boots and millions of meters of uniform cloth helped to equip the Red Army. Lend-lease also helped to improve the Soviet military communications.

The food issue. That the Germans had occupied 42% of the Russian agriculture by 1942 was an increasing problem to the Soviet leadership. Without lend-lease, which sent 4.5 millions of tons of food 1941-1945 there might have been severe food shortages leading to starvation. This in its turn could have led to public discontent. The Red Army was also strengthened by increased food-ratios.

Psychologically. Lend-lease had a psychologically negative impact on the German leadership and a psychologically positive impact on the Soviet leadership. Knowing that the Americans, British and the Canadians were all faithfully supporting the Soviet Union boosted the moral of the Red Army. This was particularly seen in 1943.

Some (particularly Soviet) sources claim that lend-lease could not change the inevitable outcome of the Eastern Front conflict -the victory of the Red Army- and hence was insignificant. One must, though, claim that lend-lease gave the Red Army a larger military superiority to Germany and this probably shortened the Eastern Front war. Lend-lease could therefore also have affected the new borders and the reach of Soviet influence in Europe that emerged in 1944 and 1945. Exactly how it affected is very speculative, but it was most certainly good for Soviet interests. This all had a wider impact on the Cold War in post war Europe, but that is another subject.

5. Conclusion

Some of this investigation is based on controversial sources. Most historians (e.g. Harrison, Ward, Samuelsson) are, however, very careful when approaching the significance of lend-lease and land somewhere in between the biased, pro-Soviet or pro-American primary sources. It is very difficult to evaluate how significant lend-lease was to the Eastern Front conflict. The problem is that the topic of the war on the Eastern Front is vast and vague. Even the highest Soviet officials, for example, were uncertain of what to do to stop the German invasion.

Furthermore, lend-lease affected the USSR in so many general ways: The industry; the military; the food-issue; psychologically. The answer to the research question must therefore itself be general.

Personally, I would stick with the opinion that the Red Army would have been victorious even without lend-lease, but that Russia’s effort in the Second World War was significantly facilitated with it. Most importantly, thousands if not millions of Russian lives were probably saved.

6.  Appendix

Table 1: Articles gained by USSR through lend-lease

Table 2: Articles gained by USSR through lend-lease

Table 3: Articles produced in the USSR

Table 4: Articles produced in the USSR

Table 5: Articles produced in the USSR 1941-1945

G. Endnotes

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